University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Volume 28
1994

Employment Discrimination Testing: Theories of Standing and a
Reply to Professor Yelnosky
Leroy D. Clark
Catholic University, Columbus School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Leroy D. Clark, Employment Discrimination Testing: Theories of Standing and a Reply to Professor
Yelnosky, 28 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1 (1994).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol28/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION TESTING:
THEORIES OF STANDING AND A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR YELNOSKY
Leroy D. Clark*
In this Article, Professor Clark addresses the legal issues surrounding the use of testers-individuals who deliberately apply for
employment to detect sex and race discrimination. He surveys three
theoretical justifications for granting standing to organizations that
run testing programs. Professor Clark then responds to a previous
article by Professor Yelnosky, disputing some of his conclusions.
Professor Clark indicates that testing isjust as necessary in higherlevel employment as lower-level employment; shows that testers can
obtain meaningful relief from the courts; analyzes the impact of the
1991 Civil Rights Act amendments; and encourages Congress to
authorize the EEOC to run tester programs that are exempt from
laws which prohibit misrepresentation of applicant credentials.

INTRODUCTION

April 6, 1987, Nightline: Ted Koppel asks Al Campanis, then
the general manager of the Los Angeles Dodgers, whether racial
prejudice accounts for so few Blacks occupying executive positions in professional baseball. Campanis replies: "No. It's just
that they may not have some of the necessities to be a field
manager or general manager." 1
A public uproar followed this awkwardly candid effort to
"explain" away racial discrimination on the grounds that Blacks
lacked the business and administrative acumen required for
front office jobs. Higher-ups in the Dodgers organization apologized and Mr. Campanis was fired. 2 The event was stunning,
*
Professor of Law, Catholic University, Columbus School of Law. B.A. 1956,
City College of New York; LL.B. 1961, Columbia University School of Law. I wish to
acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Ms. Sheryl Miller, a recent graduate
of the Catholic University Law School. I also benefitted from the careful reading and
comments of Ms. Claudia Withers, Executive Director of the Fair Employment Council
of Greater Washington. The views expressed herein, however, should not be deemed
to be the views of Ms. Withers or of the Fair Employment Council.
1.
Bill Dwyre, Campanis Questions Ability of Blacks, L.A. TlMES, Apr. 7, 1987,
pt. III, at 1.
2.
Grahame L. Jones, Dodgers Fire Campanis Over Racial Remarks, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1987, pt. I, at 1.
1
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not so much because it evidenced a stereotypical undervaluation
of Blacks' capacity to fill certain jobs, but because the unsophisticated Mr. Campanis did not realize he was giving fairly open
evidence of those sentiments.
Indeed, the hallmark ofracial discrimination in employment
today is its covert, silent, and unnoticed existence. Older
whites, who either lived in the South or were otherwise knowledgeable about pre-1960s racial discrimination, know that
American society has changed dramatically: open and approved signs of racial segregation largely have disappeared.
Younger whites-under age thirty-have little direct experience with racial apartheid, and in fact may feel victimized
when they hear of Blacks benefitting from affirmative action. 3
Most whites do not occupy positions of power that allow them
to exclude Blacks from employment opportunities, and those
with such power probably rationalize their racial bias on
"qualifications" grounds. 4 In addition, those with such power,
unlike Mr. Campanis, generally hide racial animus. Whites
probably are never told when they have obtained a position for
which a Black was more qualified. The current invisible
character of racial discrimination in employment probably
explains the wide disp~rity in public opinion polls between
white and Black perceptions of the continued presence of
racial discrimination in employment. 5

3.
While polls between 1942 and 1956 showed that "younger people were more
likely than older people to favor [racial] desegregation," A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS
AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 118 (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989)
[hereinafter COMMON DESTINY), Richard Cohen reported a recent poll by the AntiDefamation League which showed that the racial attitudes of persons under 30 are
closer to those of older persons, and in some instances younger persons are more
intolerant. Richard Cohen, Generation of Bigots, WASH. POST, July 23, 1993, at A23.
The Anti-Defamation League's poll asked whites whether Blacks prefer to remain on
welfare rather than work. Of those polled in the 50-year-old and older group, 42%
responded in the affirmative, as compared with 29% in the 30-49 age group, and 36%
in the under-30 group. Over 68% of those under age 30 thought that Blacks "complain
too much about racism." This was a higher percentage than either other age group.
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, HIGIIl.JGH'IS FROM AN ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
SURVEY ON RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA 22-25 (1993). Cohen's editorial added the
comment that the younger age group is "pathetically ignorant of recent American
history" and is resentful of affirmative action programs. Cohen, supra.
4.
Black teenagers typically have been unemployed at twice the rate of white
teenagers. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE
UNDERCLASS 124 (1992). Jencks suggests that many employers may believe that they
are making "efficient" decisions when they avoid hiring young Blacks, particularly
Black males, because they believe that they would make unruly and unreliable
employees. Id. at 123.
5.
A 1989 nationwide poll showed that 51 % of whites believed that Blacks are
not promoted as rapidly as whites to supervisory jobs. A much larger percentage of
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Yet, the evidence on the macroeconomic level reveals that
racial discrimination in employment remains prevalent. Since
1977, the Black unemployment rate has been twice the rate of
whites. 6 Moreover, a college degree has not neutralized the
disparity in unemployment: Black college graduates have an
unemployment rate 2.24 times that of white college graduates.7 This is a greater gap than that between white and Black
high school graduates. 8 Holding constant those factors which
may explain differences between the races-such as education,
experience, and other job qualifications-racial minorities are
overrepresented in lower-level occupations, and often receive
lower wages than non-minorities performing the same work. 9
Although today ample data demonstrate that racial discrimination endures in employment, the situation was even worse
prior to the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 10 which barred employment discrimination based on
race. Upon the adoption of Title VII, some commentators were
skeptical about its efficacy in eradicating racial discrimination.
They predicted that determined employers would mask
discrimination by claiming that the applicant lacked the
requisite job qualifications and that plaintiffs would not be
able to prove otherwise. 11

Blacks (83%), however, believe that Blacks are not promoted as rapidly as whites.
LOUIS HARRIS & Assoc., NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., THE
UNFINISHED AGENDA ON RACE IN AMERICA 28 (1989); see also JAMES R. KLUEGEL & ELIOT
R SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY: AMERICANs' VIEWS OF WHAT Is AND WHAT OUGHT TO
BE 179-213 (Peter H. Rossi et al. eds., 1986) (setting forth results of authors' data
and analysis, comparing it to other surveys, and attempting to provide a theory to
explain the disparity in Black and white attitudes in regard to equal opportunity).
6.
ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL
102--03 (1992); cf WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PuBLIC POLICY 42 (1987) (citing differences in Black and white
employment rates as great as 21.5%).
7.
HACKER, supra note 6, at 104.

8.

Id.

9.
COMMON DESTINY, supra note 3, at 146-47.
10.
Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
11.
See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Improving the Economic Status of Negroes Through
Laws Against Discrimination.: A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 817,
832-33 (1967). These predictions were not merely unsupported speculations: the
record of accomplishments under employment discrimination laws in some states was
poor. See MICHAELT. SoVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 19~0 (1966); Herbert Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice
Commissions: A Critical Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 22, 22-24
(1964).
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As experience with Title VII has matured, the courts have
developed interpretations which help neutralize covert discrimination in hiring, although the present solutions are
insufficient. For example, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 12 the
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can make out a prima
facie case of a Title VU violation without direct evidence of
discriminatory intent, when an employment practice unrelated
to job performance results in a statistically significant pattern
of exclusion-known as disparate impact-of minorities or
women. 13 Moreover, the Court held in Watson v. Ft. Worth
Bank & Trust Co. 14 that a prima facie case can be established
under a disparate impact claim by showing that a pattern of
employment decisions has been largely subjective. 15 These
cases, as valuable as they are, will not support charges of
racial discrimination in hiring unless the employer has a work
force large enough to generate a statistically significant hiring
pattern. Thus, Griggs and its progeny are not useful with
regard to small employers-who, as a whole, generate the bulk
of new jobs in the economy 16-but whose work force is too
small on anindiviqual basis to present the requisite statistical
profile.
The Court's analysis in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 11
provides a useful framework to address hiring discrimination
by small employers or discrimination against a single individual. ·Und¢r McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff can establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination by alleging that (1)
she applied for work for which she was qualified; (2) she was
turned down; and (3) the employer later hired a person of a
different race or sex. 18 Once the plaintiff establishes her prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to create an issue
of fact by showing some legitimate reason, not based on race
or sex, as to why the plaintiff was not hired. The plaintiff
must rebut the defendant's reason to prevail. 19
·

12.
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
13.
Id. at 432.
14.
487 U.S. 977 (1988).
15.
Id. at 991.
16.
See Steven Greenhouse, Clinton Plan-Small Businesses Smile, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1993, § 3, at 1.
17.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
18.
Id. at 802.
19.
Id. at 802-04; see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981) (holding that the plaintiff can prove that th!) defendant's proffered reason
is a pretext for discrimination). The Court materially increased the plaintiffs burden
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Even McDonnell Douglas, however, is limited in its usefulness because several factors may deter a potential plaintiff
from ever filing a charge. Specifically, an applicant may not
know the sequence in which the employer received job applications; may be reluctant to file a charge without clear information that the successful applicant was less qualified; may
have no method, except by filing a charge, to obtain such
information; or may want to spend time searching for work
rather than pursuing a discrimination charge. 2° Further,
applicants may be fearful that an employer against whom they
lodge a complaint can prejudice their search for work with
other employers. 21 Lay persons may not know that retaliation
against a person who makes a charge in good faith is unlawful,22 or even if knowledgeable, they may not believe that
authorities can enforce the anti-reprisal provision effectively.
The problems applicants confront, both in being aware of
and in being equipped to cope with discrimination, may help
explain why incumbent employees or those who have been
discharged currently file many more charges of discrimination
than those who claim discrimination in hiring. 23 Employment
gives an individual more information about an employer's
practices and possible discrimination, and also provides an
incentive to repair a negative employment record. Substantial
discrimination in hiring may go unremedied, however, because
employers engage in covert discrimination. 24
on the pretext issue in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). In
Hicks, the Court held that a plaintiff does not necessarily prevail by proving that the
defendant lied and that his proffered reasons were not the basis for the employment
action. The plaintiff must go further and convince the fact finder that the defendant's
action was motivated by discriminatory intent. Id. at 2749.
20. Michael fix et al., An Overview ofAuditing for Discrimination, in CLEAR AND
CoNVINCING EvlDENCE: MEAsUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 1, 14 (Michael Fix
& Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993).
21. This may constitute more of a problem for professionals, because their
community of potential employers is relatively small.
22.
It is unlawful for any employer, employment agency, joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeships, or labor union to discriminate against any
individual "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988).
·
23. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature ofEmployment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 984 (1991) ("While most cases
formerly attacked discrimination in hiring, today the vast majority of all litigation
suits challenge discrimination in discharge."). Employers who had fairly open
practices of discrimination prior to the passage of the statute would have been
natural targets for plaintiffs.
24. One commentator is so convinced of the inefficacy of attaining non-discrimination by litigation with the current tools that he has proposed amendments to
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The Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington (FEC),
an organization created in 1990, has instituted a creative
response to the problem of covert hiring discrimination. 25 The
organization promotes civil rights in general, and equal opportunity in employment in particular. It has pioneered employment testing as a new strategy to uncover employment
discrimination. Generally, the strategy involves sending a pair
of equally qualified testers to apply for the same job, and then
observing whether the minority or female applicant receives
less favorable results than her white or male counterpart. 26
The FEC has had two cases which are useful in considering
the key legal issue of standing for parties and organizations
acting as testers of employment discrimination. In Fair Employment Council v. BMC Marketing Corp., 21 the district court
found that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, but the appellate
court, on an interlocutory appeal, reversed in part and affirmed
in part on the standing issue. In Fair Employment Council v.
Molovinsky, 28 the FEC was sustained on the standing issue and
obtained a damage award. 29 No interlocutory appeal was taken

anti-discrimination legislation that would require employers to meet quota hiring or
pay fines. See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619 (1991). But see
Leroy D. Clark, The Law and Economics ofRacial Discrimination in Employment by
David A Strauss, 79 GEO. L.J. 1695 (1991) (responding to and critiquing Strauss's
proposal).
25.
I was one of the original incorporators of the organization. The reader will
have to judge whether that has compromised the objectivity of this Article.
26.
The FEC uniformly trained all testers regarding interview procedures. Each
tester diligently reported her experience in the application process to a FEC staff
person. FAIR EMPLOYMENT COUNCIL OF GREATER WASHINGTON' INC., ANNUAL REPORT
1990-1992, at 4. The FEC found that minority and female applicants received less
information about available jobs from employers and employment agencies than did
their white or male counterparts. Id. at 5-6.
27.
829 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd in part and affd in part, 28 F.3d 1268
(D.C. Cir. 1994). The case relied on two tests made in December 1990 at employment
agencies. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1270. In both tests, the white tester received
a referral while his Black counterpart did not. Id. All testers were male college students
who presented similar resume credentials. Id.
28.
No. 91-7202 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 1993).
29.
D.C. Jury.Awards $79,000 in Damages inBias Case Using Employment Thsters,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 155, at A-15 (Aug. 13, 1993) [hereinafter D.C. Jury Awards].
In Molovinsky, a woman seeking employment complained to the FEC that she had
been subjected to sex discrimination by a local employment agency. The FEC then sent
two female testers to the employment agency, where they were offered a waiver of the
fee if they submitted to sexual relations with the proprietor. Two male testers were
only asked to pay a fee for the referral. Interview with Claudia Withers, Executive
Director, Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc., in Washington, D.C.
(Feb. 7, 1994) [hereinafter Withers Interview].
The two female testers each received $5,000 in compensatory damages, and $10,000
in punitive damages. The bona fide applicant for employment received $17,000 in
compensatory damages, and $10,000 in punitive damages. The FEC received $22,000
in compensatory damages. D.C. Jury Awards, supra.
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on the standing issue in Molovinsky. 30
Part I of this Article addresses the question of standing for
plaintiffs in light of these decisions and current literature on
the doctrine. Part II comments critically on an article by
Professor Yelnosky, 31 which concluded that private testers do
not qualify for relief that would justify attorneys' fees and that
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or the
Commission) currently has no authority to utilize its own
testers. Part III addresses the need for legislative amendments
to Title VII.
I. THE

STANDING ISSUE

The claim that a plaintiff has no standing to bring a lawsuit
is a very powerful and efficient defense if it is sustained. It
means either that the court lacks a justiciable issue, or that
the plaintiff has not alleged legally relevant facts sufficient to
identify him as a proper party to maintain the suit. The defen-·
dant can assert this claim immediately after receiving the
complaint, and if it is sustained, no further proceedings will
follow. Because in employment discrimination, an organization's standing to sue could be crucial in encouraging private
actions, it will be addressed thoroughly here.
Scholars have found the Supreme Court's development of the
law of standing to be unsatisfactory. Commentators appear to
follow one of three approaches in describing standing doctrine.
The black-letter law approach accepts the traditional concepts
used to resolve standing issues, but finds particular decisions
contradictory, unpalatable, or hard to justify under the stated
rules. 32 The public rights model finds the present strictures on
30.
Withers Interview, supra note 29.
31.
Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover
and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skille.d, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 403 (1993). Professor Yelnosky and I agree that private parties
engaged in testing have standing to sue under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Our only disagreements are over the right of private parties to attorneys' fees and the
authority of the EEOC to engage in testing.
32.
See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v.
Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 635 (1985) (criticizing the Burger Court's standing
decisions as inconsistent, vacillating, and "at best, erratic"); N. Morrison Torrey,
Indirect Discrimination Under Title VII: Expanding Male Standing to Sue for Injuries
Received as a Result of Employer Discrimination Against Females, 64 WASH. L. REV.
365, 369-70 n.20 (1989) (noting that the Supreme Court itself has described standing
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the doctrine dysfunctional and urges a more liberal statement
that would open the courts to more plaintiffs and issues. 33
Finally, the functional approach argues that decisions would
be more coherent and explainable if the courts were asking the
right question. 34 This Article demonstrates that the individual
testers and their organizational backers have strong bases
from which to assert their standing to sue under the last two
approaches, but only an arguable claim under the black-letter
law approach.

A. The Black-Letter Law Approach
Under traditional standing doctrine, two primary considerations require scrutiny. First, Article III of the Constitution
limits the judiciary to deciding only matters which constitute
"cases" or "controversies."35 Second, the courts have developed
prudential principles that attempt to ensure that the party
who pursues a claim is the one best suited to do so. 36

doctrine as inconsistent and amorphous); Kurt S. Kusiak, Note, Standing to Sue: A
BriefReuiew of Current Standing Doctrine, 71 B.U. L. REV. 667, 677 (1991) (claiming
that the Court "further complicated" standing with the "zone of interest" test
developed in Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S~ 150, 153
(1970)); John C. Yang, Chapter, Standing . .. In the Doorway of Justice, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1356, 1358, 1385'.-94 (1991) (criticizing the reconstruction of the "zohe
of interest" test in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918
(D.C. Cir. 1989)).
33. Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Gouernance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1392-93 (1988); Heidi L. Feldman, Note, Diuided We
Fall: Associational Standing and Collectiue Interest, 87 MICH. L. REV. 733, 734-35,
745-55 (1988).
34. William A. Fletcher, The Structure ofStanding, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223, 228-29
(198S) (arguing that all standing questions should be resolved as questions on the
merits by looking to the underlying constitutional or statutory provisions).
35. Article III provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States ... to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party-;to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State,-between
Citizens of different States .... " U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
The Supreme Court has further defined Article III to require a case which is not
moot, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 315-20 (1974), or a case which is ripe,
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458, 459 n.10 (1974), or a case which does not
involve a political question, Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979). None
of these doctrines will be explored further, because they are not relevant to the
claims explored here.
36. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (stating
that litigants must assert their own legal interests "rather than those of third
parties"), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1223 (1988).
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The Court's primary concern in interpreting Article III is to
preserve the separation of powers by preventing the courts
from encroaching on Congress's Article I authority or the
Executive Branch's Article II powers. 37 The courts thus require
that the plaintiff prove an "injury in fact" which is "fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
likely to be redressed by the requested relief." 38 Even when a
plaintiff asserts that some "injury in fact" meeting the
constitutional threshold has occurred, the courts may still
refuse to take the case under the doctrine of prudential
limitations. 39 The courts have imposed prudential limitations
on themselves to preserve judicial resources for their most
important functions. 40 It is important to note that this second
limitation is not based on the Constitution. Accordingly,
Congress can require the courts to disregard prudential considerations by enacting legislation that grants standing to the
full extent permitted by Article IIl. 41
An example makes the significance of prudential limitations
apparent. Courts prohibit a person from suing to protect the
rights of another who is not a party to the litigation. 42 Thus,
an organization has standing to sue on its own behalf or in a
representative capaCity to redress injuries suffered by its
members. 43 An organization does not gain standing to sue on
its own behalf merely because it has expended litigation
resources to enjoin· a ·defendant's practices that impact on
another party if the organization has no representative
relationship with that party. 44

37.
See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 404 (1989) (holding
that permitting Article III judges to join certain commissions does not violate
separation of powers doctrine); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696--97 (1988)
(ruling, inter alia, that the Spe~ial Division's appointment of an independent counsel
does not encroach upon Article I).
·
38.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citations omitted).
39.
See id. at 756, 761.
40.
See id. at 752.
41.
See Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (holding that
§ 812 of the Fair Housing Act extends standing to the limits of Article III).
42.
See Marc Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law ofThirdParty Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393, 394
(1981) ("The third-party standing rule is clearly not of constitutional magnitude, but
rather is a judicially self-imposed 'prudential' limitation on the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, including the Supreme Court.").
43.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).
44.
See, e.g., United States v. San Francisco, 979 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a union may not derive standing from members who have chosen
separate representation).
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Given the above exposition of the current black-letter law,
do both of the plaintiffs-the individual testers and the
FEC-satisfy the requirements for standing? The formal
answer can be found in a simple analogy to the Fair Housing
Act. 45 The Court in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman 46 held that
individual plaintiffs and a plaintiff organization, Home
Opportunities Made Equal (HOME), who were testing for
racial discrimination had standing to bring suit against real
estate brokers who allegedly operated in a racially discriminatory manner by supplying false information about the
availability of housing. 47 The Court held that the individual
minority applicants claimed an injury within the meaning of
the statute because they claimed they had been denied
truthful information about housing due to their race. 48
The Court held that HOME had standing to sue on its own
behalf, apart from the standing it derived from its members,
because the defendants had disrupted their program of seeking racial integration in housing and the organization had to
divert resources from finding integrated housing for persons
to ferreting out arid combatting the defendants' racially discriminatory policies. 49
A conflict has developed between circuits on the proper
interpretation of the Havens case regarding the nature of the
injury that an organization must allege to have standing in its
own right. The appellate court in BMC Marketing Corp.
interpreted Havens to mean that the FEC did not obtain
standing because of its testing program. Rather, it held that
the FEC's only basis for standing was its showing that the
defendant had engaged in racial discrimination against
persons who were not testers and that, apart from testing, the
defendant had "perceptibly impaired" the FEC's programs to
achieve racial integration in employment. 50 The court thus
45.
Two student works taking this approach have concluded that testers have
standing to sue. Steven G. Anderson, Comment, Tester Standing Under Title VII: A
Rose by Any Other Name, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1217, 1219 (1992); Shannon E. Brown,
Note, Tester Standing Under Title VII, 49WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1117, 1126-27 (1992).
46.
455 U.S. 363 (1982).
47. Id. at 373-79. The Federal Fair Housing Act makes it illegal "[t]o represent
to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling
is not available ... when such dwelling is in fact so available." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d)
(1988).
48. Havens, 455 U.S. at 374-75.
49.
Id. at 378-79.
50.
Fair Employment Council v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1277 CD.C. Cir.
1994).
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expressly disapproved of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision in Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 51 which interpreted
Havens to mean that an organization demonstrated "injury"
-and thus standing-by showing that it had to deflect time
and money from some of its activities to achieve racial integration in housing into a testing program and subsequent
litigation. 52
Dwivedi may be a better reading of Havens than BMC
Marketing Corp. BMC Marketing Corp. criticizes Dwivedi by
questioning the basing of standing on the costs incurred in
instituting litigation: under such a holding any organization
could establish standing in its own right merely by virtue of
bringing a lawsuit. 53 The Dwivedi court's point could be answered by limiting standing. Instead of basing standing on a
diversion of resources to litigation per se, standing could be
limited to only those organizations which incur the additional
costs of hiring and training testers and directing an investigation which uncovers the defendant's discriminatory conduct.54 This is "time and money" which otherwise could have
been spent on the organization's regular counseling program
-thus frustrating the organization's goals. 55 BMC Marketing
Corp. acknowledges that Havens expressly refers to a "drain
on the organization's resources," but argues that this was
"simply another manifestation of the injury that those [illegal]
practices had inflicted upon 'the organization's noneconomic
interest in encouraging open housing.' "56 The BMC Marketing
Corp. court saw the only possible injury to the organization as
the hindrance to its racial integration program.
The BMC Marketing Corp. court may have felt compelled to
reach this outcome because, under the version of Title VII
which governed the case, a plaintiff could only secure an

51. 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990).
52. Id. at 1526.
53. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1277.
54. The district court in BMC Mktg. Corp., in line with the standard of the
Seventh Circuit, found that the FEC had standing because it was forced to expend
resources to conduct a second test of the defendant to confirm the discriminatory
result of the first test. 829 F. Supp. 402, 406-07 (D.D.C. 1993).
55. The appellate court in BMC Mktg. Corp. argued in the alternative that the
drain on the FEC's resources was not an injury because any loss to its non-tester
programs was "self-inflicted": the FEC, not BMC Marketing Corp., determined the
use of resources for testing purposes. 28 F.3d at 1276. Nevertheless, it could just as
well be argued that the testing was mandated by the defendant's behavior-it was
the defendant who adopted a covert form of racial discrimination which could be
uncovered only by the FEC's testing investigation.
56.
28 F.3d at 1277 (quoting Hauens, 455 U.S. at 379).
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injunction against prospective racial discrimination. 57 Under
the Fair Housing Act58 involved in Dwivedi and Havens-and
under the current Title VIl59-a plaintiff could also be
awarded compensatory damages for his injuries. 60 It is clear
that the Havens court granted the organization standing to
sue exclusively based on its right to receive money damages
for injury done to it as an organization: the court expressly
declined to rule on the standing of the organization via the
injury to its members, and the request for an injunction had
been removed. from the case at the request of the plaintiff
organization. 61 Moreover, the court in Havens quoted the
following from the plaintiff's brief: "Plaintiff HOME has been
frustrated by defendants' racial steering practices-in its efforts
to assist equal access to housing through counseling and other
referral services. Plaintiff HOME has had to devote significant
resources to identity and counteract the defendant's [sic]
racially discriminatory steering practices."62 The court then
said:

If, as broadly alleged, petitioners' steering practices have
perceptibly impaired HOME's ability to provide counseling
and referral services for low- and moderate-income home-

57.
Prior to 1991, plaintiffs were limited under Title VII to claims for back pay
and an injunction against future discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988), as
amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 authorized the imposition of compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional
discrimination. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1072 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a (Supp. V 1993)). The alleged acts of discrimination by BMC, however,
occurred before November 1991. Landgraf v. US! Film Products, 114A S. Ct. 1483
(1994), has held that the new provisions are not retroactive.
58.
Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as ameded at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
59. See supra note 57.
60.
If, as I argue, an organization has standing to sue under Title VII, the
organization also could receive compensatory damages.
61.
Havens, 455 U.S. at 378-79. One of the plaintiffs in the original suit who had
not been dismissed for lack of standing had secured an injunction against the
defendant's racial steering practices by the time the case reached the Supreme Court.
Thus, the Court acquiesced in the organization's request that injunctive relief be
removed from consideration. Id. at 370. The plaintiff organization and the defendants
had entered into an agreement before the case reached the Supreme Court that the
money damages amounted to $400 for each plaintiff. Id. at 371. In discussing whether
that agreement had made the case moot, the Court said, "[i]frespondents [including
the plaintiff organization] have suffered an injury that is compensable in money
damages of some undetermined amount, the fact that they have settled on a measure
of damages does not make their claims moot." Id.
62. Id. at 379 (emphasis added).
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seekers, there can be no question that the organization has
suffered injury in fact. Such concrete and demonstrable
injury to the organization's activities-with the consequent
drain on the organization's resources-constitutes far more
than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social
interests . . . .63
Thus the court may have seen that two forms of injury were
possible: first, the interference with the organization's pursuit
of the "abstract goal" of racial integration, and second, the
extra "drain on the organization's resources" to "identify and
counteract" the defendants' covert and racially discriminatory
practices-the latter being compensable by money damages. 64
Organizations which exist solely to detect discrimination
through testing programs would suffer under the black-letter
law· approach. Under this approach, an organization might
lack standing if it does not function as a de facto employment
agency for active job seekers, because it would not have separate activities which would be drained by testing. This result
would undermine testing for two reasons. First, individuals
probably could not successfully conduct testing without support and training from an organization. Second, the law would
be creating a perverse incentive which would force such an
organization to tack on or invent functions collateral to its
primary role. The organization should be able to function
primarily or exclusively to aid and foster the building of a case
for litigation because organizations like the FEC are non-profit
organizations that operate on charitable gifts. Their resources
are thus limited by the extent of the gifts, and they could
obviously conduct more testing if they could expend resources
solely on that activity. 65

63. Id.
64. Id. An organization might also receive punitive damages under the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(l) (1988), but to receive such damages the
organization would not have to prove any injury to itself as an organization, but only
that the defendant's discrimination was "reckless or callous." See, e.g., Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (stating the standard of proof for punitive damages);
Ashbury v. Brougham, 866 F.2d 1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 1989) (same).
65. Under the amended Title VII, an organization could secure reimbursement
of the costs of the testing through a claim for compensatory damages, but only if it
meets the test for standing and can claim an "injury." See supra note 57. In fairness
terms, defendants who discriminate should be made to reimburse these costs since
they are caused by the defendant's unlawful, covert conduct. Reimbursement would
allow the FEC to investigate a greater number of employers and employment
agencies which discriminate, thus hastening an end to employment discrimination.
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B. The Public Rights Mode

The limitations of the black-letter law approach suggest
exploring the standing question under the public rights model.
One commentator, Steven Winter, has put forth such a theory
and has criticized the black-letter law approach because that
approach has an individualist premise that rights are owned
distinctly and separately by persons. 66 Winter argues that this
assumption fails to recognize that "[s]ometimes the interests
that society chooses to protect are shared by a community."67
Winter notes that in order to bring such a suit, the framers of
our Constitution accepted forms of suit by any common citizen
against governmental unlawful actions, and that in order to
bring such a suit, a citizen did not have to allege an injury
from the illegal governmental conduct that was unique in
comparison to that suffered by others. 68 The citizen merely
needed the information necessary to prove the governmental
illegality. 69
Winter further argues that nothing about the constitutional
norms which govern the justiciability of suits in the courts
should bar a legislative body from creating private rights to
sue based on the public rights model. 70 If the defendant's
conduct jeopardizes the public's interests, then Winter sees no
difficulty in allowing any citizen who has the requisite information about such conduct to sue to protect the public. 71 He
argues that little distinguishes such legal actions from the
various circumstances in which we allow, or require, one
person to sue in a representative capacity on behalf of others. 72
To be sure, some controls are necessary to assure adequate
representation, but "these are instrumental considerations
that present choices to be made, not moral evils pretermitted

66.
Winter, supra note 33, at 1480.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 1406-09 (explaining that a number oflaws in force at the framing
of the Constitution allowed third party informers to bring an action to enforce the
law). But cf. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209
(1974) (holding that taxpayers and citizens do not have standing to sue to enjoin
members of Congress from simultaneously holding positions in the military reserves
in violation of Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution).
69. Winter, supra note 33, at 1408-09.
70. Id. at 1513-14.
71. Id. at 1490-91.
72. Id. at 1480.
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by a priori philosophic or constitutional limitations."73 The
public rights rationale would permit organizations like the
FEC to function solely to generate litigation against a defendant that has engaged in employment discrimination which
resulted in injury to the public interest. 74
Winter's article, however, largely focuses on the standing
barrier that the black-letter law approach creates to suing
governmental bodies. 75 Although Winter suggests an expansion
of his model to the private sector, the history he uses to
support his theory is grounded solely in suits to control governmental bodies. Therefore, the model may not be easily
translated into the private sector. It is easier to make the
assumption that the public interest is affected by government
action than by the action of any private party. Large private
employers may be said to affect the public interest when they
engage in systematic employment discrimination because they
control a large number of employment opportunities. This
claim is weaker with respect to small businesses, each of
which may hire only one or two persons every two or three
years. Moreover, fewer barriers prevent the federal government from creating a cause of action against itself, where to
do likewise with regard to private parties would confront
constitutional problems. 76 I therefore am not confident that the

73. Id. at 1480-81.
74.
Once it was given authority to initiate suit against private parties, the EEOC
began to exercise that authority. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0(1) (1988), the EEOC
has the power to institute suits on behalf of aggrieved individuals who have filed
charges. Additionally, id. § 2000e-6(e), a commissioner of the EEOC may file a charge
where any defendant has engaged in a "pattern or practice" of illegal discrimination.
MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 478-80 (1988).
75. "All too often, the inevitable consequence of a decision denying standing is
'that the most injurious and widespread Government [sic) actions c[an) be questioned
by nobody.'" Winter, supra note 33, at 1381 (quoting United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Action Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)).
76. Title III of the 1991 Civil Rights Act created a cause of action against the
U.S. Senate for discrimination in employment. Government Employee Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, tit. III, 105 Stat. 1071, 1088 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. §§ 1202-1224 (Supp. V 1993)). Under a unanimous consent agreement dated
April 10, 1992, the U.S. Senate made the provisions retroactive to cover conduct
which occurred 180 days prior to the effective date of the Act. See 138 CONG. REC.
S5563 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1992). (The Senate Resolution amended sections of Title III
of the Act governing the internal procedures that were enacted as part of the Senate's
rulemaking authority, and therefore was not a unilateral amendment of a statute
passed by Congress). The federal constitutional prohibition against the enactment of
ex post facto laws probably would be violated if Congress retroactively sought to
make illegal private conduct that was clearly lawful when the conduct occurred. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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public rights model is an appropriate theory to support testing
and litigation by organizations like the FEC.

C. The Functional Approach
The third theory-the functional approach-might provide
a justification for conferring standing on individual testers and
· the FEC, even when the plaintiffs sue private employers. This
theory is attractive because of its simplicity and because it has
been well developed by William A. Fletcher. 77 Fletcher avoids
trying to resolve standing issues in a single legal formula such
as injury-in-fact, and abandons treating standing as a preliminary jurisdictional issue. Instead, he asserts that "standing
should simply be a question on the merits of plaintiffs
claim." 78
Some critics of traditional standing doctrine claim that the
Supreme Court adheres to Fletcher's theory in deed if not in
word, by making standing decisions through a covert judgment
on the merits of the plaintiffs claim. 79 The Supreme Court in
one arena, at least, appears to have embraced the Fletcher
approach explicitly. In Rakas v. Illinois, 80 the Court decided to
"dispens[e] with the rubric of standing'' when determining
whether a defendant in a criminal case had the right to complain of a violation of the search and seizure provisions of the

The federal government, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
probably could forbid racial discrimination in any component of the federal government, no matter how small the unit. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 34 7 U.S. 497 (1954)
(holding that racial discrimination violates due process under the Fifth Amendment).
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act limits its coverage to employers with 15 or more
employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988). Congress may have to exempt some small
employers from the legislation because there might be a claim that rights of free
association would be jeopardized if they sought to control hiring in "mom and pop"
businesses. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1959) (arguing that the obligation of a state
to comply with the dictates of equal protection of the laws .under the Fourteenth
Amendment may be conditioned by its obligation to respect rights of freedom of
association under the First Amendment).
77.
Fletcher, supra note 34.
78. Id. at 223.
79.
See Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law
Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22-23 (1982) (describing
standing doctrine as a "litany" which the Court reiterates before it "chooses up sides
and decides the case").
80.
439 U.S. 128 (1978).
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Fourth Amendment, because such an analysis is "more properly [subsumed] under ... substantive Fourth Amendment
doctrine."81 Thus, a straightforward decision on the merits of
the defendant's claims that his Fourth Amendment rights
were violated precludes "any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing."82
As shown by Fletcher andRakas, the merits of the claim are
integral to deciding the issue of standing. The purposes and
goals of the constitutional provision or the legislation claimed
as the basis for a cause of action should dictate the ruling on
standing. In Rakas, the Court decided that the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment was to protect personal privacy. 83 Because
searches and seizures by government officials are not per se
unlawful, only those that reach a certain level of intrusionunreasonable searches and seizures-are deemed illegal. The
nature of Fourth Amendment protections requires that the
Court not rule on the "preliminary'' issue of standing until it
thoroughly analyzes the substantive issues in the case. A
challenged ·search may be rendered completely legal if the
owner. of the premises gives her consent. One cannot know
that personal privacy has been unlawfully or unreasonably
invaded unless the victim of the search, and not some third
party, is before the Court.
In Fletcher's analysis, he says that the Court has erred .in
asserting that an individual must suffer an injury-in-fact
before Congress can create a statute granting standing to such
an individual. 84 Fletcher says that injury is not a factual
question, because all plaintiffs-even in those cases in which
the Court withheld standing-can describe some interest of
theirs which will be thwarted if they are not granted the relief
available under the statute. Injury in Fletcher's terms becomes
a legal question of whether the party before the court should
be granted the reliefrequested. Further, Fletcher believes that
if Congress has the constitutional authority to create a legal

81. Id. at 140.
82. Id. at 139.
83. Id. at 143.
84. According to Fletcher, the concept of injury-in-fact. developed late in the
history of the Court's development of standing, in the case of Association of Data
Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), and the injury concept
became a firm constitutional prerequisite in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Fletcher, supra note 34, at 229-30, 239-40. The Court, however, has resolved issues
involving standing in many cases prior to these without the use of this concept. Cf.
id. at 231 & n.60.
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prohibition, it should also have substantial plenary authority
to decide who should be included in the class of persons that
have a cause of action to enforce the statute: no a priori proof
of personal injury should have to be made out by that class of
persons. 85 His analysis would deem it inappropriate to demand
a showing of injury by individual testers or the FEC if Congress intended them to be in the class of enforcers.
Fletcher shows, quite adequately, that the issue of injury-infact often turns on the characterization of the plaintiffs legal
interest. 86 He addresses this through an examination ofthirdparty standing. Here the black-letter law states that a person
who is not injured-in-fact has no standing to seek legal protection for another whose rights may have been violated. In at
least one line of cases, the doctrine of third-party standing has
given way to allow individuals to assert their own rights in the
area of discrimination. In Barrows v. Jackson, 81 the Court
granted a white person third-party standing to challenge a
racially restricted covenant, because the Court felt Blacks
excluded from purchasing the property were the only persons
injured-in-fact. 88 Yet later, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., 89 the Court granted standing to a white resident resisting racial segregation in housing as a party who
was injured-in-fact because he had a right to a racially integrated environment. 90
A similar analysis could be applied to testers and the FEC
regarding their right to enforce the laws against discrimination in employment, for they could be characterized as parties
seeking to enforce the rights of others. Testers and the FEC
have interests which are jeopardized by employment discrimination. For individual testers, it is a desire to obtain correct
information on jobs from employment agencies and to avoid
the humiliation of racial prejudice. For the FEC, it is an
interest in seeing that the resources it expends on ending
employment discrimination bear fruit. Like the white plaintiffs
above, their interests are merely not as strong as Black persons who are actively seeking employment free of racial discrimination. Nevertheless, that does not per se disable testers

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Fletcher, supra note 34, at 223.
Id. at 245.
346 U.S. 249 (1953).

Id. at 257; Fletcher, supra note 34, at 245-46.
409 U.S. 205 (1972).

Id. at 211-12; Fletcher, supra note 34, at 245-46.
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and the FEC from being designated by Congress as proper
parties to enforce the statute where a legal duty that Congress
has created is being violated. Fletcher believes that the prime
question to be asked is whether Congress would have seen the
plaintiffs-testers and the FEC-as appropriate parties to
enforce the statute. 91 To be sure, some of the questions raised
by the cases on standing must be adverted to. For example, do
the plaintiffs have interests which are antagonistic to those of
the prime beneficiaries under the statute? In the context of the
employment discrimination law, the interests of the testers
and the FEC are not only congruent, but the testers and the
FEC ferret out covert discrimination that bona fide job seekers
may not know exists.
Fletcher believes that one must plumb the goals of federal
legislation to determine who should be able to enforce it. 92
Congress intended to rid the workplace of arbitrary discrimination when it passed Title VIl, 93 and has not wavered from
that goal in the intervening years. It consistently has amended
Title VII to strengthen the hand of the plaintiff class in order .
to more thoroughly eradicate employment discrimination. 94
Arguably, under the terms posed by Fletcher, if the tester
approach is sometimes the only means of effectively enforcing

91.
Fletcher, supra note 34, at 265.
92. Id. at 253.
93.
In Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971), the court
concluded that the phrase "a person claiming to be aggrieved" in Title VII showed "a
congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III
of the Constitution." Id. at 446. The Supreme Court, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), quoted this language approvingly in holding that
Congress had the same intention with respect to the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which
outlawed housing discrimination. Id. at 209.
94.
Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555,
§ 330, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)), as an addition
to Title VII's definition section, which specifies that "[t]he terms 'because of sex' or
'on the basis of sex' include ... because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions." Id. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, supra note 57, the
1991 Civil Rights Act authorized the imposition of compensatory and punitive
damages in cases of intentional discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993).
Furthermore, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 mandated that Title VII's prohibitions
against employment discrimination apply to corporations incorporated outside the
United States which are controlled by an American employer. Id. § 2000e-l(c).
Finally, the 1991 Act codified the burden of proof framework set forth in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), governing disparate impact cases. Id. § 2000e2(k). This step assures plaintiffs the right to prove discrimination under disparate
impact analysis by showing that a neutral criteria or measure used by the defendant
disproportionately denies members of the protected class access to an employment
opportunity or benefit. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32.
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the ban on hiring discrimination, then individual testers and
organizations like the FEC should be included as enforcing
agents. 95

II. A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR YELNOSKY'S
ARGUMENT THAT TESTERS HAVE NO CLAIM
TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF OR ATTORNEYS' FEES
In a recent article,96 Michael J. Yelnosky questions the
ability of lawsuits brought by private parties engaging in
testing to ferret out employment discrimination, and also
argues that the EEOC presently has no authority to engage in
testing for employment discrimination. 97 This Part will refute
a number of Professor Yelnosky's positions.

A. The Underenforcement Hypothesis
Professor Yelnosky preliminarily proposed that testing should
be limited to lower-skilled, entry-level jobs. 98 To support this
position, he argued, inter alia, that the difficulty of proving
discrimination against applicants for low-level jobs and the low
back pay awards for prevailing plaintiffs in those jobs combine
to deter private counsel from taking such cases, thus creating
an "enforcement void." 99 He also argued that employers of
higher-skilled persons incur higher costs· in processing applications, and that therefore, imposing the costs of processing
testers who will ultimately refuse an offer would be unfair to

95.
The Havens Court, working from a black-letter law approach, did not grant
standing to the whites who were a part of the testing because the Court found that
they had not alleged the specific injury-rights of association-with sufficient clarity.
455 U.S. at 374-75. Under Fletcher's approach, the whites would have standing
because they were an integral and necessary part of the testing process.
96.
Yelnosky, supra note 31.
97. Id. at 459-69.
98. Id. at 410-15, 429 n.121.
99.
Id. at 411-12. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added the possibility of compensatory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a (Supp. V 1993). Professor Yelnosky acknowledged that it is "too early to tell"
if such damages will be substantial and thus undermine his hypothesis of an
enforcement void for low paying jobs. See Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 412 n.35.
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employers. 10°Finally, he indicated that applicants for high-level
jobs have greater incentives to sue and are more likely to
succeed when they are not hired. 101
Several factors make those preliminary assumptions questionable. The overwhelming bulk of employment discrimination
suits since Title VII's passage have involved jobs for semiskilled and unskilled employment, not jobs for professionals,
executives, and other higher-skilled persons. 102 This is probably
due to the fact that lower-level jobs present less difficulty in
proving discrimination, precisely because there are fewer
subjective variables behind which a discriminating employer
can hide. 103 The tester approach may be more necessary and
appropriate for high-level employment because, as Professor
Yelnosky acknowledged, "[t]he use of testers can uncover
employment discrimination that otherwise is unprovable
because of its subtle form." 104
Moreover, state agencies or the EEOC perform basic investigative work and ultimately find that either the case has
merit-a finding of"reasonable cause" to believe that discrimination had occurred--or that it lacks merit-"no reasonable
cause." 105 If one assumes that the agencies have done a minimally adequate investigative job, few of the cases found to have
"no reasonable cause" for suit deserve to be pursued, and cases
that are found to have "reasonable cause" will be more
attractive to a private attorney.
A more significant flaw in Professor Yelnosky's proposal that
testing be limited to lower-skilled employment is that minorities and women already occupy a disproportionate number of
low-paid, low-skilled jobs, even when one holds constant levels
of education and preparation. 106 F_'urther, Professor Yelnosky's

100. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 412.
101. Id. at 415.
102. Elizabeth Bartholet,Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 945, 949 (1982) (suggesting that litigation around blue collar employment may
have predominated in the early years of Title VII because there are many more of such
jobs and because Title VII did not include academic institutions and the public sector
until the 1972 amendments to the Act).
103. Id. at 959-78 (arguing that plaintiffs have less success in litigating high-level
employment discrimination claims because courts have been too deferential to methods
of choosing and evaluating professionals, while courts aggressively challenge blue
collar selection procedures).
104. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 413.
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
106. See David H. Swinton, The Economic Status of African Americans: Limited
Ownership and Persistent Inequality, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1992, at 61,
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supposition that such jobs provide "the possibility to establish
a 'foothold' ... to move up the socioeconomic ladder" 107 may not
accurately describe many of these jobs. Many are dead-end jobs
with wages kept depressed by an oversupply oflabor and little
union protection. 108 Indeed, some economists hypothesize that
race and sex discrimination is less present in unskilled and blue
collar work than for any other kinds of work. 109 This finding
accords with what we know are the stereotypes embedded in
discrimination against minorities and women: many perceive
them as capable of unskilled work, but lacking the capacity for
jobs calling for higher levels ofintellect or the ability to manage
subordinates. 110 The tester approach, therefore, could be wasted
on the class of employers who engage in the least amount of
active discrimination in regard to the least attractive jobs,
when the real underenforcement problem could involve higherlevel jobs which pay a living wage. 111
61-118 (Billy J. Tidwell ed., 1992). Black males were less than half as likely as white
males to be in executive, administrative, or managerial positions. On the other hand,
Black males were "significantly more likely" than white males to be in less desirable
jobs such as laborer or service worker. Id. at 106.
107. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 415.
108. See WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND
CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 106 {2d ed. 1978) {discussing the causes of unemployment among Black workers).
109. Wilson comments as follows:
Jobs in the low wage sector, particularly in urban areas where most blacks are
concentrated, have a considerably lower percentage of white workers and a
substantially higher percentage of black workers than jobs in the corporate and
govei::nment sectors .... It is not surprising therefore that recent studies of
unemployment in the urban core reveal that blacks do not experience any special
employment barriers in the casual, low-paid, and menial jobs of the low-wage
sector.

Id.
The Urban Institute performed a study using testers which found that Black
applicants confronted racial discrimination more frequently in applying for white collar
positions than for blue collar work. Urban Institute Research Using Testers Documents
Bias Against Black Job Seekers, Daily Lab. Rep. {BNA) No. 94, at A-4 {May 15, 1991)
[hereinafter Urban Institute].
Congress certainly views the exclusion of minorities and women from high-level
jobs as a priority, for in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, they included the Glass
Ceiling Act to study discrimination against women and minorities in high-level
executive jobs. Glass Ceiling Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, tit. II, 105 Stat. 1081.
110. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
111. This is not to suggest that the tester approach should never be used to uncover
discrimination in unskilled work. In many cities, young Blacks, especially males, have
exceedingly high levels .of unemployment. Securing employment for such persons would
have double benefits because it might indirectly reduce the levels of crime in Black
neighborhoods. Unfortunately, factors other than race discrimination may reduce
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Professor Yelnosky asserts that persons with high-level skills
do not need the tester approach because they will be more
motivated to file suit against hiring discrimination. 112 The
typical age discrimination case undermines his assertion because the overwhelming majority of the charges allege discrimination in discharge or lay-off and not in hiring. 113 This is
true despite the fact that age discrimination complainants are
frequently sophisticated managers and professionals, and the
fact that once unemployed, older workers look for work for
significantly longer periods of time than their younger
counterparts. 114 Thus, older workers likely experience significant hiring discrimination.
Professor Yelnosky's assertion that persons with high-level
skills have more incentive to file discrimination complaints
against hiring discrimination is not borne out by the behavior
of these white collar unemployed. They are probably more
certain of their ability to prove discrimination in layoffs because
they often have a record of long service to the company they
sued and thus know its internal personnel needs. They may not
have that level of information when they apply to a new
company, nor will they know the qualifications, or age, of the
successful applicants. Proving hiring discrimination against
high-level employees over forty years-old might be difficult.
That, however, makes it especially ripe for the additional
support of a tester approach. 115

employment opportunities for ghetto youth, such as the movement oflow-skilled work
to the suburbs or the disappearance of such jobs through technological advances. See
WILSON, supra note 6, at 100-04. The flight to the suburbs, however, may be driven
by a flight from ethnic minorities and the elderly. See Marley S. Weiss,Risky Business:
Age and Race Discrimination in Capital Redeployment Decisions, 48 MD. L. REV. 901
(1989) (arguing that capital redevelopment decisions are violations of the antidiscrimination laws).
112. See Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 414-15.
113. LAWRENCE A F'ROLIK & ALlJSoN P. BARNEs, ELDERLAW: CASF.S AND MATERIALS 116
(1992).
114. Id.
115. A premise in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is that
an inference of discrimination arises when an employer operates against her own
economic interest and does not hire the first qualified applicant for an unfilled job.
Id. at 802. The tester approach might not yield such clear evidence of discrimination
when applied to high-level jobs because employers, even those with no intention to
discriminate, may not have a practice of hiring the first minimally qualified applicant.
Such employers may develop a pool of applicants first, and then make a choice,
reducing the significance of the sequence of applications. Testing for high-level jobs
may require giving minorities and women better qualifications than the person with
whom they are paired. See the discussion of manufactured credentials, infra notes
229-38.
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B. Testing High-Level Employment ls Not Too Costly
Professor Yelnosky, after an exhaustive canvass of the
applicable law, concludes that private persons have standing
to sue based on testing which discloses employment discrimination.116 Despite this conclusion, Professor Yelnosky suggests
that a number of limitations should be placed on the right to
test, such as his recommendation that employers of highly
skilled or professional employees be exempt from such testing
because of additional processing costs. 117 If one assumes that
Congress structured Title VII to permit testing, 118 that includes
an implicit policy judgment that testing is a legitimate,
approved activity and that the benefits of weeding out
discrimination outweigh the costs to innocent employers who
may be subjected to the process.
The employer who is found to be actively discriminating has
no legitimate basis for objecting to the additional costs imposed
by testing. The discriminating employer, by definition, is one
who, on the basis of race or gender, pays little or no attention
to the application of the "disfavored" tester. The costs of processing the "favored" tester and the costs of defending litigation
unsuccessfully are more appropriately ascribed to the employer's decision to operate unlawfully.
In order to prevent blameless employers from unjustly
incurring costs, and to make testing as effective as possible,
testing should focus only on those employers who present some
indicia of unlawful discrimination prior to the tests. 119 Al though

116. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 415-29.
117. Id. at 414-15.
118. The author could find no discussion of the tester approach in the legislative
history surrounding the initial adoption of Title VII in 1964. Nor do any of the cases
approving testing in the housing field cite any legislative history on the precise
question. It is not surprising, however, that Congress did not focus on the issue
explicitly at that time, because the effectiveness of such an approach would become
apparent only when traditional means of enforcement had become frustrated by
defendants adopting covert strategies to undermine compliance. Senator Alan Simpson
considered introducing an amendment to the 1991 Civil Rights Act that presupposed
that the Commission would have the right to use testers, but would have precluded
them from using testers who misrepresented their education or other qualifications.
137 CONG. REC. S15,487 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Simpson). The
amendment was not officially proposed. Id. at S15,488. Given this ambiguous history,
the courts are likely to be the instrument for such interstitial lawmaking on the issue
of standing.
119. For example, employers could be targeted for testing when they exhibit a
profile with no minority or female employees, or serious underrepresentations in
certain job categories.
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researchers have tested randomly to establish the statistical
validity of the results, 120 testing to develop litigation should not
be random. Employers who have demonstrated their nondiscriminatory hiring policies should not be targeted. If only
a suspect group of employers is the focus of rational testing,
the number of innocent employers tested ought to be low, thus
reducing the harmful side effects feared by Professor Yelnosky.
Moreover, in order to further reduce wasted expenditure, the
FEC instructs testers to immediately turn down an employment
offer to prevent the employer from losing access to a bona fide
applicant. 121

-C. Challenges to the Testers' Right to Injunctive Relief,
Class Actions, and Attorneys' Fees
Professor Yelnosky believes that the EEOC must be the prime
user of the testing approach. He asserts that private testers
will not qualify for injunctive relief or worthwhile compensatory
and punitive damages, and therefore suggests that the private
bar may not take such cases. 122 He predicts that private testers
will obtain, at best, empty declaratory judgments which simply
announce that Title Vii has been violated, but which do not
provide prospective rel~ef of any substance. 123
Professor Yelnosky is really revisiting the standing question
in an altered form. 124 The effect of standing doctrine is to

120. The Urban Institute developed a research design to determine the general
level of discrimination against Black applicants for employment. See Urban Institute,
supra note 108, at A-4. The researchers needed a representative sample of employers
in order to make the finding that in one out of every five cases, a white applicant
"advance[d] farther through the hiring process than the equally qualified black
applicant." Id. at A-4 to A-5. Poorly focused testing in the context of litigation would
be highly inefficient four out of five times. Id.
121. There may be another class of "innocent" employers-those in which top
management has a non-discriminatory policy that is undermined by lower-level
managers who make the actual hiring decisions. These employers, however, need not
wait to be sued. They could take precautionary steps to avoid litigation by adopting
an internal testing program to find out whether lower-level managers are faithfully
carrying out their non-discrimination policy, especially if their actual hiring data does
not reflect their written policies. The FEC has offered to provide technical guidance
to employers who would like to adopt such a regime. Withers Interview, supra note
29.
122. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 435-38, 443-45.
123. Id. at 439-41.
124. See supra Part I for a discussion of standing in this context.
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preclude the results which Yelnosky predicts. It prevents the
courts from addressing abstract questions about legality which
do not have an impact on concrete relationships between
parties. As the following analysis shows, courts can find many
concrete relationships around which to structure relief.
1. Testers May Obtain Injunctive Relief-Because testers
cannot accept employment if offered, they are necessarily
precluded from seeking relief either in the form of back pay or
a court order that they be hired immediately. The question
remains, however, whether testers are entitled to an injunction
on a class action basis against the employer to bar him from
continuing discriminatory hiring practices. On this point,
Professor Yelnosky expressed doubt that courts would be
willing to issue injunctions. He observed that a series of courts
refused to grant an injunction unless the record contained
evidence of widespread, pervasive discrimination. 125 None of the
cases he cites, however, impose such a finding as a strict
precondition to granting an injunction, 126 and he admits that
one case expressly denies that proof of a "history of prior
discriminatory practices" is necessary before an injunction can
be granted. 127
Professor Yelnosky fails to make the distinction made by
Professor Robert Belton in the only volume which is devoted
exclusively to remedies under employment discrimination
laws. 128 Belton reads the case law to make an injunction
mandatory when a plaintiff produces "abundant evidence of a
consistent pattern of past discrimination and the absence of
evidence ... of a reasonable possibility of future compliance." 129
In other cases where the plaintiff produces proof that a
defendant has intentionally violated Title VII, Afbemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody 130 "imposes an obligation on the district court to
issue an injunctive decree which will ... bar like discrimination
in the future. "131 Belton indicates that courts should impose a
"presumption of entitlement" to injunctive relief once a violation

125. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 436.
126. Id. at 436 n.163.
127. Id. at 436 n.162 (quoting Berkman v. City of New York, 705 F.2d 584, 595
(2d Cir. 1983), which held that relief designed to assure compliance is "appropriate
whenever a Title VII violation [is] found, irrespective of any history of prior
discriminatory practices or the intent of the defendant").
128. RoBERT BELTON, REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (1992).
129. Id. at 207.
130. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
131. BELTON, supra note 128, at 203 (citing Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418).
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is proven, and that the court's discretion in "denying injunctive
relief in any form" is "limited." 132 Thus, a better reading of the
cases cited by Professor Yelnosky is that an injunction should
issue when a clear violation of Title VII is found, unless
something in the record either shows that the employer has
ended its discrimination in a manner which makes a reoccurrence unlikely or which reveals a structural impediment that
would prevent the plaintiff or members of her class from being
harmed in the future. 133
Professor Yelnosky also reasoned that testers cannot obtain
injunctions because testers cannot meet the "personal benefit"
requirement for injunctive relief, since they are not searching
for employment at the time of the defendant's discrimination. 134
The analysis of the court of appeals in BMC Marketing Corp. 135
runs counter to his reasoning. The court remanded the case to
allow the district court to entertain an amendment of the
complaint by the individual plaintifftesters. 136 If the individuals alleged that they were likely to return to the defendant
employment agency in the reasonably near future as bona fide
applicants, and that the defendant had a settled policy ofracial
discrimination, then an injunction could issue. 137 If the

132. Id. at 203, 208.
133. Id. at 207. Professor Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 436 n.163, cites the following
cases in which injunctions were denied: Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651,
660-61 (4th Cir. 1990) (denying an injunction in a situation where an employer had
fired the supervisor who had sexually harassed the plaintiffi; EEOC v. Financial
Assurance, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 686, 695 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (denying an injunction in the
absence of pressure by the EEOC and the absence of any evidence in the record that
the defendant had engaged in similar discrimination in the past).
In some cases cited by Professor Yelnosky, the plaintiffs voluntary action made
the prospective injunctive reliefclearly inapplicable. In Hampton v. IRS, 913 F.2d 180,
182 (5th Cir. 1990), plaintiff alleged that his reassignment was motivated by racial
discrimination, but did not contest his subsequent discharge, therefore an injunction
ordering his reinstatement was not appropriate. In Backus v. Baptist Medical Ctr.,
671 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (8th Cir. 1982), the plaintiff left the defendant's employ
voluntarily during the pendency of the employment discrimination suit and thus could
not secure an injunction for reinstatement.
134. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 437.
135. 28 F.3d 1268, .1274 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
136. Id. at 1275.
137. See id. The court of appeals disagreed with the way the lower court distinguished City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). In Lyons, the plaintiff was
denied an injunction to prevent the local police from continuing the practice of applying
a chokehold in their traffic stops and arrests on the grounds that the plaintiff could
not demonstrate that he was likely to be the object of such unconstitutional police
behavior in the future. 461 U.S. at 111. The lower court in BMC Mktg. Corp. held that
the tester plaintiffs had established a probability of future injury because unlike an
arrest, which must be initiated by the police, the testers "are free to return to BMC
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individual testers made the same allegations with respect to
an employer, they too should have a right to injunctive relief.
Professor Yelnosky admits that some of the cases he cites for
the proposition that injunctive relief would be denied to testers
are inconsistent with other Title VII cases. 138 He also states
that "[t]he decisions denying injunctive relief to nonemployee
plaintiffs ignore Congress's purpose in empowering Title VII
plaintiffs to act as private attorneys general vindicating both
their own rights and the rights of others." 139 Individual testers
should be viewed as equivalent to nonemployed plaintiffs: their
legal rights have been violated and they should be allowed to
perform the quintessential role of "private attorneys general"
on behalf of others. 140
2. Testers Are in the Same Class as Bona Fide
Applicants-Individual testers should be able to bring a class
action and secure an injunction to bar hiring discrimination
against all those in their class, just as an attorney general
would. Professor Yelnosky argues that Supreme Court cases
have prohibited classes from being drawn too broadly in Title
VII actions, and he assumes that testers could not be in the
same class as bona fide job applicants. 141
Professor Yelnosky's assumption that testers and bona fide
job seekers must be treated as members of separate classes is
untenable from a legal or factual standpoint. Ifinjunctive relief
were appropriate, as ·argued above, it could not be limited
sensibly to plaintiffs in their testing posture. 142 Clearly, the

at any time in search of nondiscriminatory employment referrals .... they alone
control the decision to initiate contact." BMC Mktg. Corp., 829 F. Supp. at 405. The
court of appeals held that the individual tester plaintiffs must additionally allege that
they intended to return to the defendant employment agency in the near future, and
that the defendants had a settled policy of practicing racial discrimination. See 28 F .3d
at 1274. The court of appeals thus read Lyons as refusing an injunction, in part
because the plaintiff had not alleged that it was a settled policy of the City of Los
Angeles to have its police apply excessive and unconstitutional force in arrests. See
id.
138. "This analysis [denying injunctive reliet] is somewhat inconsistent, however,
with the courts' treatment of Title VII injunctions in other contexts." Yelnosky, supra
note 31, at 438 n.164.
139. Id. at 438 n.165.
140. Coles v. Havens Realty Corp., 633 F.2d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that
there is no reason why surrogates for those who are victims of discrimination cannot
pursue their cause).
141. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 437.
142. Such an injunction would produce an illogical order, enjoining the defendant
from refusing an offer of employment to plaintiffs on racial grounds only when they
were not seeking employment.
·
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injunctive order would have to protect the plaintiffs against
racial discrimination should they, at any time prospectively,
elect to become bona fide job seekers. Therefore, the order
would naturally protect other prospective bona fide job seekers.
Neither of the two cases Professor Yelnosky cites supports
treating testers and bona fide applicants as different classes.
East Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc. v. Rodriguez 143 holds
that three Mexican-Americans who were not qualified for
promotions-and thus had no legal rights violated because
they did not receive promotions-could not represent a class
of Mexican-Americans who were qualified and were claiming
a denial of promotion on the grounds of national origin
discrimination. 144 The case thus holds that persons who have
not had any legal rights violated cannot represent persons
whose legal rights have been violated. Even Professor
Yelnosky acknowledges that if testers have had their rights
violated, a declaratory judgment would be appropriate. 145
The question then remains, whether the violations of the
legal rights of testers are so distinct and separate from violations of rights of bona fide applicants that they cannot be in
the same class. Professor Yelnosky cites General Telephone Co.
of the Southwest v. Falcon, 146 which holds that a plaintiff
alleging discrimination in promotions cannot represent a class
of persons whose only claim is discrimination in hiring. 147
Falcon thus is not support for treating testers and bona fide
applicants as separate classes because, unlike the individuals
in Falcon, they are not pursuing interests in two entirely
different aspects of the employment process. Both groups are
pursuing the same legal rights-either a right to have job
information from employment agencies or job offers from
employers on a racially non-discriminatory basis. Also, given
the realities of the search for employment, testers in this
context are not very different from persons who genuinely
canvass the employment market. An employed person may
inquire about employment opportunities without a firm decision to take a job even if one is eventually offered. Unemployed persons may apply to many employers simultaneously:

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

431 U.S. 395 (1977).
Id. at 403.
Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 439.
457 U.S. 147 (1982).
Id. at 155, 158-59.
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if they accept one offer, additional offers must be declined. 148
Thus, many bona fide applicants are factually indistinguishable from testers from the point of view of the employer. 149
Although Professor Yelnosky cites a statement made in East
Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc. v. Rodriguez that a class
representative must "suffer the same injury as class members,"150 all class members are not forced to claim identical
damages. Even in a single class of bona fide applicants, all of
whom were denied employment on discriminatory grounds,
class members could have different monetary damages depending on whether they were employed or unemployed at the
time of the discrimination, or whether they subsequently
secured other employment in mitigation of damages. 151
3. Testing Organizations May Recover Attorneys' FeesProfessor Yelnosky does not discuss whether an organization
that organizes the testing could have a right, separate from the
individuals used in the testing, to secure an injunction and
attorneys' fees. In BMC Marketing Corp., the court carefully
scrutinized the standing issue and rejected some of the plaintiff's claims to standing, 152 but found that the FEC had standing

148. If a plaintiff must have a fixed commitment to work only for the defendantemployer, then the bulk of job seekers would not have standing. Most assuredly, most
third-year law students, who apply to more than one employer for permanent
employment upon graduation, would not be protected against race or sex discrimination in hiring.
149. Moreover, bona fide applicants for employment have an obligation to mitigate
damages by using "reasonable diligence" to obtain other employment pending the
resolution of the charges. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g){l) (Supp. V 1993); Ford Motor
Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982) (construing identical statutory language
to require all unemployed Title VII claimants to use "reasonable diligence in finding
other suitable employment"). If a bona fide applicant was employed at the time of the
discrimination, or found other employment that was now permanent, and if either job
paid well enough to defeat a claim for back pay, under Professor Yelnosky's standards, that person would be identical to a tester, for she would have no right to an
injunction since she could show no "personal benefit" from prospective relief.
150. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 438 n.166 (citing Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 403).
151. See, e.g., Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269, 1280 (4th Cir.
1985) (awarding varying amounts of backpay damages to the different plaintiffs in
a Title VII employment discrimination suit).
152. The court rejected both the individual's and the organization's claims to
standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1981(Supp.V1993). BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1271,
1278-81. This Article is limited to an exploration of the testing under Title VII, so
there will be no extended comment on this portion of the court's opinion. It is
important to note, however, that the courts dispute whether Congress meant to
exercise its full powers under Article III with respect to§ 1981 as it did with respect
to Title VII. A recent note also opposes many of the arguments made by the court in
BMC Mktg. Corp. See Michele Landever, Note, Tester Standing in Employment
Discrimination Cases Under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 381 (1993).
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to sue as an organization if it could prove that the defendant
employment agency was disrupting the organization's goal of
eradicating employment discrimination. 153 Because the court's
ruling came under the unamended version of Title VII, and the
organization could not claim back pay, the only form of relief
would be an injunction barring the defendant from prospective
discrimination. Thus, the organization would be achieving 100%
of its litigation goal and would therefore have a clear right to
full attorneys' fees. This is critical, for as this Article has
argued, the organization is the primary actor in the testing
strategy.

D. Impact of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
The 1991 amendments to Title VII should have an impact on
whether individual testers will have access to private attorneys. The amendments give a successful plaintiff a right to
compensatory and punitive damages. 154 The substantial recovery that may result from this greater relief could. impact
the level of attorneys' fees. Professor Yelnosky predicts, however, that such damages will be low in tester cases because in
a few cases-each in the housing arena-testers recovered
only $1000. 155 Contrary to this prediction, when the trial court
allowed juries to entertain compensatory and punitive
damages for the testers led by the FEC, they gave each a total
of$15,000. 156 Further, Professor Yelnosky's extrapolation from
housing cases is inappropriate because damage awards for

153. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1277-78.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993).
155. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 443.
156. Professor Yelnosky believes that the award was high in Fair Employment
Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. Molovinsky, No. 91-7202 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug.
12, 1993), because the facts were "particularly egregious." Yelnosky, supra note 31,
at 443 n.185. The defendant sought to get the plaintiff testers to trade sex for job
information. See supra note 29 for the facts of this case. Professor Yelnosky took note
of the $10,000 in punitive damages, but did not further discover that each of the
tester plaintiffs recovered an additional $5000 in compensatory damages. Withers
Interview, supra note 29. The appellate court reversed the award of compensatory
and punitive damages to the individual plaintiffs in BMC Mktg. Corp. on the grounds
that the 1991 amendments to the 1964 Civil Rights Act were not retroactive, 28 F.3d
at 1272, but the award illustrates what juries might do when compensatory and
punitive damages are available under the 1991 amendments.
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housing discrimination have traditionally been low. 157 It would
not be surprising if juries find that erecting discriminatory
barriers to employment is more serious than discrimination in
housing, and thus warrants higher damages. A defendant who
blocks minorities from access to employment does more
damage than one who blocks minorities from housing, because
access to employment is determinative of one's whole lifestyle,
including where one can afford to live. The typical person
looking for housing generally has housing and is simply
looking for more convenient or attractive quarters.
The most important impact on a plaintiff's likelihood of
recovering attorneys' fees comes from the portion of the 1991
amendments which, in part, reverses Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins. 158 In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court held that,
although the defendant had in part relied on a discriminatory
factor in denying an employment opportunity, Title VII was
not violated ifthe defendant could establish that it would have
made the same adverse decision if it had relied only on
legitimate factors. 159 The Civil Rights Act amendments entitle
a plaintiff to an injunction and attorneys' fees ifthe defendant
relied on a discriminatory factor regardless of whether the

157. Congress sought to address the problem oflow damage awards by amending
the Fair Housing Act in 1988 to remove the $1000 cap on punitive damages. Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 8(2), 102 Stat. 1633
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(l) (1988)). The level of awards for plaintiffs who made
bona fide searches for housing became higher after the amendment, but low awards
continued in some courts. See James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act
of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1077-78
(1989) ("[S)ingle victim settlements and awards during the past few years have
generally exceeded twenty thousand dollars .... Nonetheless, some courts lag far
behind the national pattern as they continue to make only symbolic awards
reminiscent of an earlier era."). One commentator, taking note that damage awards
continue to be an insufficient mechanism for abating housing discrimination, argues
for additional affirmative relief. See Margalynne Armstrong, Desegregation Through
Private Litigation: Using Equitable Remedies to Achieve the Purposes of the Fair
Housing Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 909, 928-33 (1991) (arguing that courts should fashion
injunctions to require defendants to rent or sell the property to a member of the
plaintiff's class, if the plaintiff has found other accommodations).
158. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
159. Id. at 258. In Price Waterhouse, the female plaintiff had been denied a
promotion to partner in her accounting firm. Some of the partners relied on gender
stereotypes, but others denied her a partnership because she had poor interpersonal
skills. A majority of the Court decided that an employer would not violate the statute
ifit could prove that even ifit had not taken gender into account unlawfully, it would
have made the same decision regarding that person. Id.
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employer is able to prove that it ultimately would have made
the same adverse decision on lawful grounds. 160
Professor Yelnosky reads this provision as authorizing an
award of attorneys' fees only in "mixed motive" cases and
asserts that it did not change the rule that plaintiffs like the
testers, "who can prove a violation of the Act, but who are not
entitled to significant relief," cannot recover attorneys' fees. 161
He cites Slade v. United States Postal Service 162 as a case that
would remain unaffected by the amended Civil Rights Act in
this respect. 163 The plaintiff in Slade argued that he was
entitled to attorney fees because he had secured reversal of
the district court on some preliminary procedural grounds
which allowed the case to go forward on the merits. 164 The
court determined that those procedural victories ultimately
had not led to a substantive victory for the plaintiff, and
therefore rejected the plaintiff's demand for attorneys' fees. 165
I agree with Professor Yelnosky that the 1991 amendments do
not require that attorneys' fees be awarded in a case like
Slade. That case, however, is wholly unlike the case of a tester
who does prevail on the merits and proves that the defendant
was engaged in an intentional refusal to make a job offer
solely because of race or sex.
Under the amendments, Congress deemed the prevailing
party to be the plaintiff who proved that the defendant relied
on a discriminatory factor. Congress not only allowed recovery
of attorneys' fees, but also authorized the issuance of an
injunction to prohibit the defendant from engaging in future

160. The new amendment provides that if the plaintiff "demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(m) (Supp. V 1993), and the respondent proves that it
would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief ... , and attorney's fees and
costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim
under Section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission,
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment ....
Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
161. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 445 n.196.
162. 952 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1991).
163. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 445 n.196.
164. 952 F.2d at 361-62.
165. Id. at 362.
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intentional discrimination. 166 Under the amendment, a person
who is expressly denied employment but who may have never
qualified for employment with the discriminating employer is
nonetheless authorized to act as a representative to secure an
injunction protecting others against discrimination. The tester
duplicates the position of the plaintiff in a mixed motive case
in three ways: (1) she proves that the defendant engaged in
intentional discrimination and (2) she acts as a representative
to protect others from future discrimination (3) even though
she is not entitled to a position with the defendant. The tester
arguably has an even stronger claim to attorneys' fees because
the tester may, unlike the plaintiff in a mixed motive case,
recover punitive and compensatory damages under the
amended Title Vll. 167 Professor Yelnosky's assertion that the
1991 amendment has no effect on a tester's right to attorneys'
fees 168 would produce a paradoxical result. Under his interpretation, a plaintiff in a mixed motive case who could have been
refused an employment opportunity legitimately but who
proved that the defendant introduced a discriminatory factor
into the employment process would be entitled to an injunction
and attorneys' fees. On the other hand, a plaintiff tester, who
proved that the defendant's action resulted solely from
discrimination would have no right to an injunction or
attorneys' fees. Congress could not have intended such an
irrational result.

E. Breach of Contract, Barratry, and Ethical Violations
Professor Yelnosky suggests that state common-law actions
and disciplinary proceedings may be brought against testers
and their attorneys as a means of deterring the use of testers.
Professor Yelnosky sets forth three hypotheses: (1) that testers
might be sued for breach of contract; 169 (2) that lawyers
representing them may be subject to charges of barratry; 170
and (3) that it may be unethical for the tester, if seen as an
agent of the attorney, to make contact with an employer who
is represented by counsel. 171 Professor Yelnosky seems to raise
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993).
42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993).
Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 430-34.
Id. at 446-51.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 455-58.
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these issues only as straw men to be picked apart. Many of his
claims regarding potential unethical activity have been refuted
in an article published subsequent to his own. 172
Professor Yelnosky acknowledges that an employer presently does not have a breach of contract action whenever an
applicant turns down a job offer. The possibility that some
employers may begin to seek "certifications of a bona fide
interest" 173 from job applicants is unlikely to impact the law
significantly because few employers would be likely to risk the
chilling effect such an action could have on the entire job
application process. Testers are not that different from bona
fide applicants who ultimately turn down a job offer. 174 Would
employers want to invite a lawsuit every time that happened?
These employer representatives probably have not thought
through the potentially negative consequences for employers
if they began to contractualize the job application process.
Conversely, such a move might legitimate claims by all
disappointed bona fide applicants that the employer had
breached its obligation to consider their application in good
faith whenever they did not receive an offer. This is hardly a
road down which employers will want to venture.
Professor Yelnosky also raises a number of potential state
law impediments to organizations who wish to engage in
testing. 175 A shorthand response to these claims is that, if
federal law gives private parties a right to test to litigate
against employment discrimination, then these state law claims
will be preempted if they unduly burdened that right. 176 In
particular, Professor Yelnosky recognized the possible application of NAACP v. Button 111 to the claim of barratry. In that
case, the Court held that Virginia violated the First Amendment by using its barratry statutes to bar a lay organization
from advising Blacks of their legal rights against racial
segregation and referring them to a particular attorney. 178 Such
172. Alex Y.K. Oh, Using Employment Testers to Detect Discrimination: An Ethical
and Legal Analysis, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 473 (1993).
173. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 448.
174. See supra notes 147-95 and accompanying text.
175. See Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 446-59, where he discusses the ethical
obligation not to deal with another lawyer's client.
176. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (holding that federal law may
preempt state law if the state law stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress"). See Yelnosky, supra note
31, at 471-73.
177. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
178. Id. at 426, 428-29.
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litigation was deemed to be a form of political expression. 179
Professor Yelnosky, however, suggests that Button might not
protect lawyers who counsel testers because "the use of testers
is intended to create a cause of action and not simply to
encourage individuals to assert existing causes of action. "180
This distinction is not persuasive. In one sense, the cause of
action exists in the employment arena in exactly the same way
that a cause of action existed in the context of Button. One may
safely presume that the defendant employer has regularly
engaged in a pattern and practice of racially based refusals to
hire Blacks in the same way that Virginia officials regularly
refused to allow Blacks to attend public schools with whites.
The only difference in the employment arena is that the racial
discrimination is covert rather than overt as in Button.
Discrimination's covert quality does not mean that a cause of
action does not exist, or that it is not an ongoing violation of
the law. From this standpoint, the tester is merely collecting
evidence to prove an already existent claim. Testing merely
enables the right person--one who has been "injured" in
standing parlance-to bring suit. This role is not very different
from the one played in the context of Virginia's segregated
schools. Only persons who could prove a certain relationship
with the defendant school board--current students who were
"injured" by the policy-had standing to sue. As a practical
matter, in both situations lay persons had to be informed by
attorneys that their rights and the rights of those similarly
situated were being violated.
Perhaps Professor Yelnosky is arguing that an attorney
cannot advise a prospective client about the law of standing
because this advice might generate client activity which would
"create" a cause of action. 181 An attorney does not function
unethically in this context any more than an attorney who
informed Black parents in Virginia that their children would
have to transfer from private schools to the public schools if
they wanted to have standing to sue the public school board to
end racial segregation. Furthermore, an attorney who gives a
lay person legal advice about how to become a "private attorney
general" must be protected by Title VII because the statute is

179. Id. at 431.
180. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 455.
181. Id. at 451.
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designed to encourage lay persons to function in that role. 182
Such activity furthers the public interest in attaining a
discrimination-free workplace.
Only one case was decided involving testers in the employment context prior to the 1991 amendments. In Lea u. Cone
Mills Corp., 183 the lower court refused to award the plaintiff
testers attorneys' fees because attorneys participated in
"recruiting the plaintiffs." 184 The court of appeals disagreed,
upholding the testers' rights to an injunction and attorneys'
fees.185

F. EEOC Authority with Regard to Testing
The EEOC has issued a policy guideline asserting that testers
have standing to sue. 186 The EEOC backed away from exploring
whether the agency itself had the authority to use testers after
criticism from representatives of the business conimunity. 187
Professor Yelnosky suggests that Congress should amend
Title VII to authorize the EEOC to engage in testing because
the agency does not have statutory authority to engage in
testing before or after a charge has been filed. 188 Moreover,
despite Professor Yelnosky's recognition that private parties
who test have standing to sue, he also concludes that the EEOC
"cannot ... orchestrate the use of testers by private groups." 189
1. The EEOC's Authority to Coordinate and Utilize Testing
by Others-Preliminarily, Professor Yelnosky's analysis does
not take into account the provisions governing the EEOC's
powers which are pertinent to the issue of whether it can be
involved, either independently or in conjunction with others,
in a program of testing to carry out its statutory mission.

182. See Coles v. Willis, 633 F.2d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting the role of
plaintiffs in Title VII as "private attorneys general").
183. 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969), modified, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971).
184. 301 F. Supp. at 102.
185. 438 F.2d at 88. One commentator, however, believes that "the Lea court's
abbreviated analysis provides little to build upon and [that] the tester standing issue
is not dispositively addressed." Anderson, supra note 45, at 1219.
186. Policy Guidance, Notice No. N-915-062, [2 Interpretations] EEOC Compl. Man.
(CCH) 'I 2168, at 2313-15 (Nov. 20, 1990).
187. See Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 409 n.17.
188. Id. at 468-69.
189. Id. at 462.
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Yelnosky asserts that the Commission could not support private
parties who engaged in testing, an activity that he presumes
is lawful and legitimate, 190 although Title VII expressly states
that "[t]he Commission shall have power-(1) to cooperate with
and, with their consent, utilize regional, State, local, and other
agencies, both public and private, and individuals." 191
This provision provides a reasonable basis to argue that the
EEOC is empowered to work with private individuals, private
organizations like the FEC, and even state agencies which do
have the authority to engage in testing. 192 Indeed, such a
cooperative arrangement could prevent one of the very abuses
of testing about which Professor Yelnosky expressed some
concern. He indicated that employers who were not engaged
in hiring discrimination could claim that the burden of
processing applications of testers who actually were not seeking
employment was cast upon them. 193 The EEOC collects data
which, if shared with private organizations, would prompt the
testers to avoid targeting employers with a profile of hiring
minorities and women on a non-discriminatory basis. 1!14 To read
the statute as blocking such cooperation is to impair the
efficiency of the testing and to increase the number of innocent
employers who are subjected to the process.

190. Id. at 415-29.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (1988) (emphasis added).
192. Professor Yelnosky notes that the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination used testers in 1993 to enforce their local employment discrimination
statutes. See Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 406 n. 7 (citing Massachusetts Agency Settles
Job Tester Cases, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 77, at A-18 (Apr. 23, 1993)).
It is even possible that the Commission has the statutory authority to help finance
a testing program undertaken by a state agency:
The Commission may cooperate with State and local agencies charged with
the administration of State fair employment practices laws and, ... within the
limitation of funds appropriated specifically for such purpose, engage in and
contribute to the cost of research and other projects of mutual interest
undertaken by such agencies ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
193. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 414-15; see supra Part II.B.
194. Professor Yelnosky rightly observes that proof of hiring discrimination for lowlevel jobs is made more difficult because, "[g]enerally there is little if any paper
record." Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 412. The EEOC, however, has the regulatory
power to define what records employers must "make and keep" that are "relevant to
the determinations of whether unlawful employment practices have been or are being
committed." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (1988). Pursuant to this authority the Commission
could begin to require employers with disproportionately low percentages of minorities
and women to keep records on hiring decisions to fill the gap.
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Testing requires organizational backing to provide training,
discipline, and control of the process to produce a clear picture
of discrimination. 195 This Article argues that because it is
crucial that the testing process be guided in a fair manner,
entities such as the FEC should have organizational standing
to sue in addition to the persons used as testers. Indeed, as
Professor Yelnosky notes, employer representatives have called
for the EEOC to establish some "minimum standards offairness
[to] be observed by testers." 196 Congress empowered the EEOC
to give "technical assistance and training regarding the laws"
it enforces, 197 and this could provide the statutory basis for
training private organizations that wish to set up testing
programs.
As previously suggested, employers could use the testing
process to establish a litigation-free means of uncovering hiring
discrimination that may occur at lower levels in the corporation, unbeknownst to superiors in the company. 198 The
Commission could aid employers in structuring an internal
testing program because it is empowered "to furnish to persons
subject to this subchapter such technical assistance as they
may request to further their compliance with this subchapter
or an order issued thereunder." 199
Using testers is an excellent means of gauging the extent of
hiring discrimination in employment, as revealed by studies
conducted by the Urban Institute. 200 The Commission is
authorized to engage in research independently or in conjunction with state and local fair employment practice agencies
and to publish the results. 201 Under these provisions, the
Commission could conduct a research program using testers to

195. Coordination also could avoid entangling innocent employers in poorly
conducted testing.
196. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 407 n.14.
197. "The Commission shall establish a Technical Assistance Training Institute,
through which the Commission shall provide technical assistance and training
regarding the laws and regulations enforced by the Commission." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e4(j)(l) (Supp. V 1993).
198. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(3) (1988).
200. See Urban Institute, supra note 109, at A-4.
201. Title VII provides that "[t)he Commission shall have the power- ... (5) .to
make such technical studies as are appropriate to effectuate the purposes and policies
of this subchapter and to make the results of such studies available to the public;"
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (1988), and that "[t]he Commission may cooperate with State
and local agencies charged with the administration of State fair employment practice
laws and ... engage in and contribute to the cost of research." Id. § 2000e-8(s).
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gauge the level of hiring discrimination nationally or in any
given region. Professor Yelnosky's conclusion would mean that
the Commission could not use evidence of discrimination
gathered in such research to file a charge, or in support of a
private individual's charge, no matter how compelling.
2. The EEOC's Authority to Engage in Testing-The foregoing reveals the multiple means that empower the Commission
to be involved indirectly with a testing program. Professor
Yelnosky's conclusion that the Commission is forbidden to use
testers directly to uncover or prove discrimination, either
before a plaintiff files a charge or after, is also deeply flawed.
Professor Yelnosky bases his argument that the EEOC lacks
authority to conduct an undercover oper;:ition upon a single
court decision that determined that the EEOC could not be
sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) because the
FTCA only authorized suits against criminal law enforcement
agencies. 202
The problem with this argument lies in some of its assumptions. First, Professor Yelnosky assumes that the undercover
operation conducted in employment testing is identical to an
undercover criminal investigation. 203 Second, he assumes that
criminal law enforcement agencies have a monopoly on a
specific mode of detecting violations of the law. Third, he
assumes that a civil law enforcement agency must be given
this monitoring authority expressly. 204
The activity of the EEOC is unlikely to exceed the bounds of
the Fourth Amendment. Professor Yelnosky fails to consider
that the judiciary's exertion of constitutional control and its
imposition of a standard requiring express statutory authority
varies with two factors: (1) the seriousness of the consequences
for the citizen, i.e., crinilnal sanctions as compared to civil
penalties; and (2) the degree of intrusiveness of the investigative techniques on citizens' liberty, property, and privacy. 205

202. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 462. Professor Yelnosky states that the EEOC
lacks "traditional law enforcement powers, such as the power to conduct undercover
operations." Id. His citation of EEOC v. First Nat'! Bank of Jackson, 614 F.2d 1004
(5th Cir. 1980), makes it clear that by "traditional" law enforcement powers, he refers
to agencies with criminal law investigative powers and the right to make arrests.
203. See supra note 201.
204. "The Commission is permitted to conduct only those investigations identified
in the provisions of Title VII." Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 461. "Congress did not
explicitly authorize the Commission to conduct undercover operations." Id. at 462.
205. Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (upholding the issuance
of a warrant for housing inspection on something less than traditional probable
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The Fourth Amendment does place strictures on investigations
in the civil arena, but because no liberty or incarceration
consequences generally exist, civil authorities are given wider
investigative scope and need not meet the stringent probable
cause thresholds that are a pre-condition to criminal investigations. 206 The strongest controls are placed on criminal law
enforcement agencies because they have the power to obtain
a warrant to search and seize and to arrest-the most
intrusive investigative techniques. In contrast, civil agencies
such as the EEOC typically lack authority to search or to gain
custody over a person. 207 Before the activity of either a civil or
criminal agency is deemed to be covered by the Fourth
Amendment, it must rise to the level of a search or seizure. 208
The use of undercover agents who interact with a willing
defendant is so remote from an intrusion of the defendant's
privacy or property interests that courts do not consider such
actions a search or seizure within the definition of the Fourth
Amendment. 209 Therefore, a law enforcement agency does not
need to acquire a warrant prior to engaging in such activity
even when it has time to secure one. 210 The only controls that
courts have placed on the use of undercover agents by law
enforcement agencies in a purely investigative stage is a
prohibition on entrapment. An agency cannot go beyond mere
fact-gathering in order to deliberately induce a citizen to
violate the law. 211 Professor Yelnosky acknowledges that a
properly controlled use of testers poses no risks of entrapment.212
Employment testing is critically different from an undercover operation conducted by criminal law enforcement

cause, in part, because the "inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at
the discovery of evidence of crime").
206. Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1977).
207. One example is the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA).
BENJAMIN W. MINTZ, OSHA: HISTORY, LAW AND POLICY 335-529 (1984).
208. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (holding that
surveillance of activity in an open field is not a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, and thus requires no warrant or probable cause).
209. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
210. See White, 401 U.S. at 749.
211. The Court limited the government's use of undercover agents after criminal
· charges have ripened into adversarial proceedings, but the interests protected there
are not privacy or property, but rather the defendant's access to counsel. See Brewer
v .. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977).
212. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 474-81.
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officials. To be valid and useful, testing must be strictly observational and not-as it must be in the criminal context213-an
interaction with a putative defendant that creates an impression that a violation of law is being invited. Civil agencies
often engage in activity which is, in essence, identical to
employment discrimination testing. They put staff in a place
where they can observe directly whether the companies governed by the agency are complying with the law in the ongoing
conduct of their business. 214
Professor Yelnosky's assumptions contravene the general
standards that courts have developed in interpreting the
breadth of a federal agency's investigatory authority. The
general rule is that an agency's investigative authority extends to those techniques which are reasonable in the light of
the enforcement tasks that the agency confronts. Where a
specific technique is a reasonable extension of a basic statutory authority to investigate, the federal agency "need not
have specific regulatory authority for each and every one of its
inspection and investigational procedures."215
Professor Yelnosky's failure to recognize the relative lack of
intrusion or burden on potential defendants in the tester
process allows him to assume that testing must be treated
similarly to the formal investigative process, which can ensue
only after a charge has been filed and notice given to the
employer. 216 In fact, although the EEOC cannot coerce an employer to produce information prior to a charge being filed,
nothing prevents the EEOC from undertaking an investigation
such as a testing program prior to filing a charge.

213. An investigator in the criminal context must pose as a ready cooperator in
the violation of the criminal law in order to disguise his true identity and avoid being
attacked. PETER L. ZIMROTH, PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE-THE l'ROSECUTION AND AcQUflTAL
OF THE PANTHER 21, 160-64 (1974) (describing an account of an undercover agent
assigned to a group that police believed was plotting to bomb public facilities in New
York City).
214. See In re Establishment Inspection of Metro-East Mfg. Co., 655 F.2d 805, 812
n.14 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that OSHA inspectors are authorized to wear personal
sampling devices while in an employer's workplace to record violations with regard
to the toxicity in the air).
215. In re Establishment Inspection of Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 13 F.3d 1160
(7th Cir. 1994) (allowing videotaping by OSHA inspectors of employees in the employer's workplace to gauge alleged ergonomic hazards, although regulations did not
expressly authorize this technique).
216. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 463.
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All of the cases that Yelnosky cites 217 to support his claim
that the Commission cannot investigate prior to filing a charge
actually stand for the proposition that the EEOC cannot
obtain a contempt citation for a business's failure to turn over
documentation until after a charge is filed. 218 These cases are
inapplicable because the EEOC would not attempt to enforce
a contempt citation against an employer during a testing investigation. Further, the limits in these cases are not
applicable to testing. The very essence of the technique is that
the defendant is not coerced into giving information, but is
merely observed in the normal course of doing business. The
defendant controls the hiring process and voluntarily invites
the public to participate, exposing only as much of its business
practices as it chooses. By using the tester technique, the
Commission merely steps into that process to observe whether
the defendant's voluntarily initiated process observed the
rights of applicants to nondiscriminatory treatment.
Compared with the EEOC's formal investigatory process,
testing is much less burdensome. All the investigative powers
which the Commission may utilize after a charge is lodged
could impose substantial costs on the defendant. An employer
could be forced to produce evidence, allow inspection and
copying of documents, and allow access to his premises, even
against his will. 219 Congress placed limitations on this part of
the Commission's investigative powers and allows employerdefendants to challenge Commission requests for information
which are burdensome or irrelevant. 220 An employer who is
tested is not overwhelmed with informational demands, such
as could occur in the more formal EEOC investigative process.
Thus, there is no need, in terms of fairness, for notice and an
opportunity to challenge this kind of fact gathering. The
Commission would secure no more information about an
217. Id. at 463 n.273.
218. A typical statement is that made by the Court in EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466
U.S. 54 (1984). "[T]he EEOC's investigatory authority is tied to charges filed with the
Commission; unlike other federal agencies that possess plenary authority to demand
to see records relevant to matters within their jurisdiction ...."Id. at 64 (emphasis
added). The EEOC is only limited in its authority to inspect or secure information by
relying on the coercive power of a court.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1988) (right to copy documents); 29 U.S.C. § 161(1)
(1988) (right to subpoena); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1977) (right
to inspect).
220. Indeed, some statutory control of this process may be constitutionally mandated to protect citizens from unbridled governmental intrusions and disruptions of
business. See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 324 n.22.
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employer's hiring process than a private person could secure
prior to filing a charge. Finally, Professor Yelnosky's attempt
to analogize limitations on the EEOC authority to investigate
prior to the filing of a charge with that of the National Labor
Relations Board221 (NLRB) is inapposite because the NLRB,
unlike the EEOC, has no authority to initiate charges on its
own.222
Professor Yelnosky's contention that no provision for investigation exists prior to filing a charge ignores an important
investigation that the EEOC does undertake before it files a
charge. The Commission has the power to require employers
to submit reports that are "reasonable, necessary, or appropriate" for enforcement of the statute. 223 The Commission collects
reports annually from employers detailing the racial and
gender composition of their workforce. 224 The data in these
reports can become the basis for a Commissioner's charge of
discrimination. Moreover, courts have held that when an employer is obliged to make reports to a federal agency to show
compliance with the statute, the agency can make nonintrusive investigations to verify the accuracy of the

221. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 463 n.273.
222. Note, however, that the NLRB has ruled that employers commit an unfair
labor practice when they refuse to hire a union staff member solely because she is
simultaneously on the payroll of the union and organizes and acts as a watchdog
regarding the employer's violations of the National Labor Relations Act. Three
circuits have agreed with the Board. See Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d
1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Escada (USA), Inc. v. NLRB, 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2872
(3d Cir. 1992), enforcing 304 N.L.R.B. 845 (1991); NLRB v. Henlopen Mfg. Co., 599
F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1979) (dictum); Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224 (1992).
Two circuits have disagreed. H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir.
1989); NLRB v. Elias Bros. Big Boy, Inc., 327 F.2d 421, 427 (6th Cir. 1964).
The noted labor scholar, William B. Gould IV (now Chairman of the NLRB)
believes that pursuing full-time employment ought to be a practice of both unions and
civil rights organizations:
The recent record of"testers" ... in connection with employment discrimination litigation makes it clear that the role of such individuals is important to
effective enforcement of the statute. Enforcement oflabor law and anti-discrimination law is promoted through the use of sophisticated full-time representatives of unions or civil rights organizations, whose purpose in the employment
relationship involves more than assuming the role of applicant or employee.
WILi.JAM B.

GoULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM-THE FU'ruRE OF EMl'LoYMENT RELATIONSHIPS

AND THE LAW 24 (1993).

223. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c)(3) (1988).
224. Employers subject to Title VII with 100 or more employees are required. to
file annual reports detailing the race and gender of employees by job classification.
29 C.F.R. § 1602. 7 (1994).
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employer's reports. 225 The EEOC could use testers to verify
that an employer follows the nondiscriminatory hiring policy
that its reports suggest.
Professor Yelnosky acknowledges that it "may seem incongruous" that the Commission has the power to initiate charges
but lacks the power to engage in pre-charge investigations
before doing so. 226 He argues that this incongruity is resolved
because the Commission can file charges without "reasonable
cause" to believe a violation occurred, and can institute its
investigation to substantiate the charge later. 227 The courts
have established a low threshold for filing a Commissioner's
charge. 228 These decisions can be supported with the speculation that Congress may have sought to prevent early, and
perhaps dilatory, challenges to the initial filing of a Commission charge. This conclusion does not mean that Congress
thought it desirable for unsubstantiated charges to be filed or
that the Commission should forgo easily available evidence
before filing a charge. Congress placed limits on the Commission's formal investigatory powers to protect employers, but it
is hardly protective of employers for the Commission to forgo
a simple, informal monitoring technique that could preclude
some employers from ever being charged or investigated
further.
Excluding the powers of discovery during litigation, private
parties lack the range of investigatory powers that the Commission possesses after a charge has been filed. Professor
Yelnosky's reading of Title VII would mean that, despite the
fact that the Congress gave the Commission that superior right
of investigation, it gave the Commission less informal investigative power in the area of testing. The unreasonableness of
Yelnosky's interpretation is further highlighted by Congress's
action to strengthen enforcement in 1972 by authorizing the
Commission to file charges in its own name. 229 Yelnosky's
225. Service Founding Co. v. Donovan, 721 F.2d 492, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1983)
(holding that OSHA need not rely exclusively on employer reports designed to reveal
compliance with air emission standards; it can verify those reports by attaching
personal sampling devices to OSHA employees to wear for monitoring purposes).
226. Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 466.
227. Id.
228. See Professor Yelnosky's account of the "loosening" of constraints on Commissioner's charges under the 1972 amendments. Id. at 468.
229. See PLAYER, supra note 74, at 201-02. "Title VII was significantly amended
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. A primary impetus for the 1972
Amendments was a desire of civil rights advocates to provide the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) with enforcement power." Id. at 202.
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interpretation attributes inconsistent motives and outcomes to
Congress rather than following its explicit goals.

Ill. THE NEED FOR ACTION BY CONGRESS
Congressional action is not required before the EEOC can
participate in testing for hiring discrimination. Congressional
action may be needed, however, to enable the EEOC to coordinate activity in this field and to utilize the most effective
testing techniques.
Te~ting conducted merely by presenting Blacks and whites
who actually possess similar levels of education and work
experience does not present the problems which may exist if
testers misrepresent their education and experience. Yet it may
prove difficult to find Blacks and whites with identical
backgrounds, especially if the testing is done for high-level
employment as proposed in this Article. Therefore, it might be
desirable for the organization conducting testing to retain some
flexibility to misrepresent the backgrounds of the testers. This
would be an especially appropriate role for the EEOC.
Misrepresentation of one's background in order to obtain
employment constitutes a serious problem and is already
illegal. 23° For example, a person who files an application for
employment with a federal agency that includes materially
false statements could be subjected to a criminal charge. 231 A
·few state statutes make false statements in employment
applications a civil or criminal breach of the law. 232 A recent
230. Senator Alan Simpson, during deliberations on the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
considered introducing an amendment to the Act that would prohibit the EEOC from
misrepresenting the education, experience, or other qualifications of persons used as
testers. See supra note 117.
231. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West Supp. 1995) makes it a crime to give false statements
to departments or agencies of the United States government in the transaction of
business.
232. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 9412 (West 1988) (making it a criminal violation
for a person seeking employment as a licensed private security guard to "make any
false statement or material omission in any application, ... filed with the commissioner"); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 289.060 (1986) (making any applicant for employment liable for
fees that she would have been obligated to pay her employment agency, even though
she has lost the employment through material misrepresentations of fact in her
employment application); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-122.1 (1994) (making it a criminal
violation to "make a false written representation of fact that he has received a degree
or other certification signifying merit, achievement, or completion of an educational
program involving study, experience, or testing from a secondary school, a
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article noted that most state legislation does not expressly
control all false statements in employment applications, but
primarily prohibits submission of false or forged academic
credentials while securing employment or obtaining admission
to a profession or educational institution. 233 Credible studies
"estimate that between twenty and thirty percent of all working
persons have embellished their credentials."234 That number
represents an astoundingly high percentage of misrepresentations concerning crucial facts. More state and federal legislation
would be appropriate not only to penalize the submission of
false academic diplomas but also to penalize any misrepresentations in applications for employment.
Strengthening legislation would pose minimal problems for
a tester program. A tester program which has been as tightly
controlled and disciplined as the one mounted by the Fair
Employment Council would unlikely be subjected to criminal
charges. 235 The goal of such a program is not to secure actual
employment for the tester under false credentials: therefore,
the conduct does not satisfy the mens rea element of the
criminal charge as required, for example, under the federal
law. 236 The current federal and state legislation is not expressly
aimed at a tester situation because such legislation is designed
to punish persons actually seeking to obtain employment or
admission to a profession through fraudulent behavior. 237 Such

postsecondary educational institution or governmental agency in an application for:
(a) Employment"); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-18-1 (1994) (making it a misdemeanor to
knowingly provide an agent of an employer with any document containing false
statements).
233. See Joan E. Van Tol, Detecting, Deterring and Punishing the Use of Fraudulent
Academic Credentials: A Play in Two Acts, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 791, 819-22 (1990)
(citing 12 states which have enacted statutes that regulate the use of academic
credentials).
234. Id. at 794.
235. Nevertheless, Claudia Withers, Director of the FEC, stated that her organization employed testers only against private employers because oflegislation that made
the submission of false credentials to public bodies unlawful. Withers Interview, supra
note 29.
236. United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1287-88 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that
a false statement is insufficient to sustain a criminal conviction, for there must be
proof of an intent to gain a material advantage on the basis of the falsity).
237. Cf Jimerson v. Kisco Co., 542 F.2d 1008 (8th Cir. 1976). Employers may,
naturally, discharge people who have made material misrepresentations on an
employment application.
The discovery of misrepresentations also may protect an employer in instances
where a former employee makes a claim that his discharge was motivated by
discrimination because of the so-called after-acquired evidence rule, which permits
employers to defend a discrimination charge with evidence gathered during litigation.
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legislation does, however, evidence a general public policy of
discouraging deliberately constructed misstatements in the employment process. In addition to the burden on employers who
may suffer the expense of hiring, and then firing a person who
is unqualified-some in very sensitive positions-employers are
forced to bear the additional costs of verifying all of an
applicant's statements to determine whether the applicant
submitted a false application. Although a tester program using
fabricated credentials would not ultimately violate the legislation prohibiting misrepresentations in the employment
application process, strong public policy reasons argue for
limitations on the individuals who would be allowed to resort
to the technique. 238 If any need exists for Congressional
attention to the tester process, it would be in this discrete
arena. 239 Arguably, either the EEOC should be the only entity
allowed to arm its staff with false credentials, or other organizations should be required to obtain approval from the EEOC.
Because the employment testing process is much more complicated than testing in the housing arena, Congress should
consider funding the EEOC to provide training and guidance
to private organizations.

The circuits disagree, however, whether such after-acquired evidence operates as a
total or partial defense. See Ann C. McGinley, Reinventing Reality: The Impermissible
Intrusion of After-acquired Evidence in Title VII Litigation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 145,
159-71 (1993). The Supreme Court recently resolved that disagreement when it
determined that after-acquired evidence of a former employee's wrongdoing can bar
reinstatement, but does not bar all recovery. McKennon v. Nashvill_!! Banner Pubishing
Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885-86 (1995).
238. Arguments that state legislation which prohibits misrepresentations in the
employment application process were preempted would probably fail. Where Congress
has not expressly preempted state legislation, the courts are less likely to find
preemption where the state has strong public policy reasons for a right to continued
control over the subject matter. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Jointers,
430 U.S. 290 (1977). In any event, the preemption argument would not be applicable
to the federal legislation that also prohibits falsification of credentials in the application process. The courts are likely to read the two pieces of legislation together to see
if both can survive. In that event, the courts likely would find that Title VII permits
testing, but that it cannot be done by a misrepresentation of credentials where it is
unlawful under state or federal law.
239. Congress should take action on only one other matter: it should clarify that
an organization like the Fair Employment Council could be structured solely to prepare
and process testers and still retain standing to sue. See supra notes 42-64 and
accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Discrimination on the grounds ofrace, ethnicity, gender, and
age are still widespread in our society. It is not surprising that
stereotypes and the habits they foster have lingered. Discrimination in employment was made illegal by federal statute
approximately thirty years ago, but discrimination on the basis
of sex or race has been an active phenomenon since the
founding of our nation.
It is a sign of progress that those who practice such
discrimination now must do so covertly. The change in the character of discrimination calls for new techniques to fight it.
Using testers in the employment field is one of those techniques, and it is heartening that the courts that have dealt with
this new approach have been receptive. If the major litigator
against employment discrimination-the EEOC-began to utilize the new approach, the technique could present a real
impetus to the employer community to change its practices or
to monitor its hiring process more closely. This powerful tool
is legitimately within the present arsenal of the EEOC. The
only legislative attention that is needed is control over the
presentation of credentials to targeted employers.

